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This paper focuses on the role of government capital as a critical productive input when the level 
of services that the agent derives from it is subject to congestion. I develop a two-sector “non-
scale” production model in which there are two types of firms, conventional profit-maximizing 
private firms, and “public firms”, whose objective is to produce a specified quantity of 
government investment goods  – determined by government policy  – at minimum cost.  
Furthermore, the production functions of the two sectors need not in general coincide.  Using this 
two-sector production set-up I assume that the positive externality of the public capital is 
associated with two types of congestion,  proportional and  aggregate. A variety of fiscal 
disturbances are analyzed.  Because of the complexity of the model the analysis is carried out 
using simulations of a calibrated economy.  The effects of tax policies are remarkably robust with 
respect to the relative capital intensities of the two productive sectors.  In contrast, the effects of 
government investment are much more sensitive to this aspect.  The introduction of congestion 
decreases the steady state growth rate of the economy. The relative congestion has stronger 
effects when the variation in the government investment is analyzed, whereas the absolute 
congestion is more relevant in the analysis of the change in the tax on capital income. The papers 
highlight the intertemporal dimensions of fiscal policy and the tradeoffs these involve for 
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1.   Introduction 
This paper focuses on the role of government capital as a critical productive input 
when the level of services that the agent derives from it is subject to congestion.  The 
analysis of the productive role of private capital has received significant attention in the 
recent years, but in most cases this has been carried out using a one-sector model of 
production, in which public capital enters the aggregate production function together 
with private capital and labor; see e.g. Arrow and Kurz (1970), Baxter and King (1993), 
Futagami, Murata, and Shibata (1993), Turnovsky (2003).  This implicitly assumes that 
all production occurs in the private sector.  The government then enters the private 
market and makes its purchases, in competition with private agents, using the resources 
it generates from tax revenues and from borrowing. 
While this is a reasonable description  one could argue that  the governments 
effectively conduct their own productive operations.  Consider the following stylized 
description.  A government passes legislation to invest in an airport facility, say.  It sets 
out precise specifications of the project, which it then puts out for bids to private 
contractors who will hire labor and employ private capital to carry out the project.  But 
instead of being free to hire productive factors to maximize his profit -- and thereby 
determine his output level (the size of the airport) endogenously -- the contractor is 
constrained (to win the contract) to construct the project, as specified by the 
government, most efficiently.  Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the 
technology employed in the public project need be the same as that in the private sector.  
Indeed, one can plausibly argue that government investment projects that involve the 
nation’s infrastructure may well be more capital intensive (in private capital) than is the 
average technology employed in the private sector. 
  In Turnovsky and Pintea (2003) we develop a two sector model in which private 
output is produced in one sector by profit-maximizing firms.  The production function in 
that sector depends upon the stocks of both private and public capital, as well as upon 
endogenously supplied labor.  Public capital introduces a positive externality in 
production, so that the complete production function is one of overall increasing returns 
to scale in these three productive factors.  Government capital is produced in a second 
sector by “public firms”, hiring labor and private capital, with public capital also   3 
providing an externality. In hiring their productive factors these firms compete with the 
private sector and therefore need to pay competitive factor returns.  The objective of the 
public firm is to provide the new public capital, as determined by government policy, at 
minimum cost.  Thus in contrast to the usual model in which the government uses its 
resources to finance its direct purchases of new investment, the government uses its 
resources to purchase the services of the productive factors that it employs.  These 
resources are obtained by taxing capital income, labor income, and consumption, or by 
imposing non-distortionary lump-sum taxation.   
  I use this model as a base model in my analysis. However in this paper I assume 
that the agent can not chose how much labor to provide. Since labor is exogenously 
determined, the tax on consumption and labor income are going to behave very similarly 
to a lumps sum tax, without influencing the evolution of the real variables in our 
economy.  
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce congestion effects in the two 
production functions. The congestion effects in a one sector economy have been 
extensively researched in the context of AK models; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 
1995),  Turnovsky (1997),  Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) and Eicher and Turnovsky 
(2000).  This paper introduces two types of congestion in a context of a “non-scale” 
growth model following Eicher and Turnovsky (2000). The positive externality of the 
public capital is associated with both relative and aggregate congestion
1. The relative or 
proportional  congestion refers to the fact that the level of services, derived by an 
individual from the provision of a public good depends of the usage of his capital stock 
relative to aggregate capital stock. Highway usage constitutes an example. Unless you 
drive your car, you do not derive any service from the public good. The aggregate 
congestion refers to the fact that the level of the services derived by an individual 
depends on how much that public good is used on the aggregate. Medicare and hospital 
services are a good example. If these services are used by many people then the level of 
services that one individual enjoys is reduced (crowding).  To use the previous example 
of  the public good being a airport facility, relative congestion refers to the fact that you 
do not benefit from it unless you take the plane, and the more times you take the plane 
                                                 
1 see also Edwards (1990) for different specifications  of production functions with congestion   4 
the more you are going to benefit from it. Absolute congestion refers to the fact that as 
there aree more and more planes that want to use it, they will be more restricted in their 
usage and one individual plane is going to derive less of the services provided by the 
airport.  
  The  model I  employ is a “non-scale” growth model of the type introduced by 
Jones (1995a, 1995b), Kortum (1997), Segerstrom (1998), and others.  This model that 
can be viewed as an extension of the neoclassical model (generalized to allow for non-
constant returns to scale) has the property that the long-run equilibrium growth rate is 
determined by the interaction between the population growth rate, technological  and 
congestion production parameters and is independent of government policy parameters.   
The non-scale model typically yields slow asymptotic speeds of convergence
2. 
This implies that policy changes can affect growth rates for sustained periods of time so 
that their impacts during the transition from one equilibrium to another will eventually 
accumulate to potentially large influences on steady-state levels. Thus, the fiscal policy 
has important effects on the levels of key economic variables, such as the per capita stock 
of capital and output. These considerations suggest that attention should be directed to 
analyzing the impact of fiscal policy on the transitional dynamics and this has been the 
focus of a number of previous studies; see e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Baxter 
and King (1993), King and Rebelo (1993), Devereux and Love (1994),  Turnovsky 
(2003).   
The goal of this paper is to analyze the effects of government investment and 
changes in the alternative tax rates in this two-sector productive e conomy with 
congestion effects.  I set out the dynamic equilibrium of this economy and show how the 
stable adjustment is characterized by a two dimensional locus in terms of the two 
stationary variables, referred to as “scale-adjusted” per capita stocks of private and 
public capital. Due to the complexity of the model the effects of various policy shocks 
are analyzed numerically.  Different fiscal shocks have different impacts on government 
revenues, and to preserve comparability I normalize the shocks in terms of their impacts 
on the  intertemporal government deficit.  Both the transitional adjustments and the 
eventual long-run equilibrium responses are considered.  A significant share of the 
                                                 
2 see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).   5 
analysis is devoted to the welfare of the representative agent, the instantaneous utility 
and intertemporal welfare, as represented by the present value of the accumulated 
benefits.   
The major focus of the paper is on highlighting the intertemporal dimensions of 
fiscal policy and the tradeoffs these involve for economic performance, paying particular 
attention to the role of the more general production structure and different congestion 
effects. 
The analysis focuses on positive shocks to the economy from the long run welfare 
point of view, an increase in the share of public capital and a decrease in the tax on 
capital income. Public investment increases consumption and welfare in the short run, 
even as resources are attracted towards government investment. In our model doubling 
the rate of public investment from 4% to 8% i nvolves short-run welfare increase of 
between 2.5%  - 4.3% and intertemporal welfare gains of between 8.3%  - 13%, 
depending upon the relative sectoral capital intensities.  Normalized government 
investment will be significantly more expansionary as the capital intensity of the public 
sector increases. 
  The effects of a decrease in the capital income tax vary less with the intensity of 
capital in the public production function. The strongest effect is on the allocation of the 
resources across the two sectors towards the sector less intensive in capital (private 
sector if the public production function is more intensive in capital and public sector in 
the opposite case).  The analysis of the normalized cut on the tax on capital income 
reveals a decrease in the consumption to output ratio of about 2% which leads also to a 
decrease in the output to capital ratio of 10% and an increase in the overall output level 
of 25%. In the short run the normalized reduction in this tax leads to immediate welfare 
losses of about 2.8%, as resources are diverted away from consumption toward private 
capital accumulation. In the long run the accumulation of more capital and output 
generate however intertemporal welfare gains of 1.5% which are significantly lower 
than the gains that are generated by the increase in g. An increase in absolute congestion 
causes a significant decrease in the welfare in the short run. As the absolute congestion 
increases, the long run welfare gains steadily diminish until the gains derived from the 
decrease of the tax on capital income can transform into losses.    6 
In general the introduction of congestion decreases the positive effects brought by 
changes in the share of government spending and the decrease in the capital income tax. 
It also decreases the steady state growth rate of the economy. The introduction of 
relative congestion has stronger negative effects when  I analyze the increase in g, 
whereas the absolute congestion has stronger negative effects if I analyze the decrease in 
the tax on capital income. As relative congestion increases, the reallocation of resources 
from one sector to the other diminishes.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the structure 
of the model, while its equilibrium dynamics are characterized in Section 3.  Section 4 
calibrates the model and considers the numerical effects of different policy changes.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
2.1 Private Firms 
 
I shall assume that there are N private firm indexed by i. A private firm produces 
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      (1a) 
where  , ji K  represents the capital employed by the firm i,  , ji L  denotes the labor employed 
by the firm,  g K denotes the aggregate stock of public capital and K the aggregate stock of 
private capital. 1-q1 measures the degree of relative congestion and –s1 the degree of 
absolute congestion. If  1-q1is 0 then there is no relative congestion effect, how much 
capital the agent has relative to the aggregate stock of private capital does not influence 
the  level of services that he derives from the provision of public goods. As q1 varies 
between 0 and 1, the relative weight of the individual agent’s private capital influences   7 
his benefit of the public good.  If s1 is different from 0 one observes a “crowding effect”, 
the level of services that one individual derives from the provision of the public goods 
decreases as the aggregate private capital increases.  
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2.2.   Public Firms  
   
I shall assume that there are N public firms, indexed by P, that hire labor and private 
capital, paying the market wage and return to capital, so as to produce some prescribed 
level of output, J, to be used for public investment, at minimum cost.  The output of this 
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similar with (1a), where 1-qp  measures the degree of relative congestion and –sp  the 
degree of absolute congestion. The different exponents and degree of congestion allow 
for potentially different factor intensities in the public sector from those in the private 
sector. I assume that the production of output in the private sector involves a different 
technology than does the production of infrastructure produced in the public sector.   8 
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The  individual  public  firm’s optimization problem is to produce a specified output J, 
chosen by the policy maker, in accordance with the production function (3b), at a 
minimum cost: 
,, min  PiPi rKwL +                 (4a) 
   subject to the constraint  ,, GiiGGi KJK d =- &                                         (4b)              
I write the Lagrangean as  
,,, () PiPiiiGGi LrKwLJK ld =++-             (4c) 
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2.3.  Representative Agent 
  The representative agent supplies one unit of labor, a fraction ? of which  is to 
employment in the private sector and 1-? to employment in the public sector.  Agent i 
also owns  Ki units of capital, which he rents out a  fractionf to the private sector and 
1 f -  to the public sector, both at the rental rate, r 
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where Ci denotes the agent’s consumption, 1/(1) g - equals the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and ß is the time discount factor. The agent’s objective is to maximize (6a) 
subject to his accumulation equation: 
[(1)](1)(1) ikkiwcii KrnKwCT tdtt =---+--+- &          (6b) 
where  k t  =tax on capital income,  w t =tax on wage income,  c t =consumption tax and 
Ti=T/N=agent’s share of lump sum taxes (transfers). Equation (6b) assumes that private 
capital depreciates at the rate  k d , so that with the growing population, the net after tax 
private return to capital is (1) kk rn td --- . 
Performing the optimization yields: 
1 (1)           iic C
g mt
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Equation (7a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the individual’s tax adjusted 
shadow value of wealth,  µi, while (7b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to its 
opportunity cost, the after tax real wage, valued at the shadow value of wealth. The third 
equation is the Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule, equating the rate of return on 
consumption to the after-tax rate of return on capital where the return on capital 
incorporates the relative congestion effects.  Finally, in order to ensure that the agent’s 
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2.4.  Aggregate Relationships 
 
Letting the time allocation of labor to the private sector be denoted by q: 
  ,, 1 jipi LL =+;   , ji L q = ,  , (1) pi L q =- and  aggregating over  N agents: 
,, ; (1) jijpiP NLNLNLNL qq ===-=            (8a) 
Likewise, letting f denote the allocation of capital, we have in equilibrium 
,,,, , , (1) iijipijiipi KKKKKKK ff =+==-
,, ;  (1)(1) ijiipi NKNKKNKNKK ffff ===-=-          (8b) 
Equation (8a) asserts that the total supply of labor must be allocated either to one of the 
private firms or to the public firm, while (8b) describes an analogous allocation condition 
for private capital.  Using these relationships, the aggregate production function for the 
private sector and the public production function may be expressed as: 
111 (1)1(1) 1 bqbqbs b
Yg YNKK
sss s afq
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The government runs a balanced budget in accordance with 
    1 (1) KwcPP rKNwCTrKwLqY ttts +++=++-       (10) 
i.e. the government pays out of tax revenues, its production costs and a subsidy to the 
firms that incur losses due to the negative externality imposed  by the relative congestion 
effect.  
T represents the amount of lump-sum taxation (or transfers) necessary to finance 
the primary deficit and is therefore a measure of current fiscal imbalance. Recalling the 
expressions for the returns to capital and labor derived in (2a, b), it can be expressed as 
   11 
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 where  (1)(1) kkk sr ttd -=--  is the implied equilibrium of interest, V measures the 
present discounted value of the lump sum taxes or transfers necessary to balance the 
government budget over time, and thus is a measure of the intertemporal fiscal 
imbalance. 
I shall also assume that government investment is tied to aggregate private output 
by 
    JgY =               (12) 
Using the aggregate production functions, (9a) and (9b) and recalling the budget 
constraint and the returns to capital and labor, implies goods market clearing:  
K KYCK d =-- &             (13a) 
this equation asserts that private output can be costlessly transformed into productive 
private capital or consumption. Also, 
    gGg KgYK d =- &             (13b) 
 
2.5.  Macroeconomic Equilibrium   12 
  Our objective is to analyze the dynamics of the aggregate economy about a 
stationary growth path. Along such an equilibrium path, aggregate output, private capital 
stock, and public capital (due to the fact that it is a constant fraction of the private output) 
are assumed to grow at the same constant rate, so that the output-capital ratio and the 
ration of public capital to private capital remain constant, while the fraction of time 
devoted to leisure also remains constant. Taking percentage changes of the aggregate 
production functions, the long run equilibrium growth of output, private and public 
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Equations (14a, b) are necessary in order for the policy to be sustainable.  (14b) imposes 
a weak condition on the externality. (14a) shows that the growth rate decreases if there is 
an increase in either relative or absolute congestion.  
 
3.  Transitional Dynamics 
To analyze the transitional dynamics of the economy about its balanced growth 


















Using this notation, the scale-adjusted private and respectively public production 
functions can be written as:   13 
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The optimality conditions then enable the dynamics to be expressed in terms of these 
scale adjusted variables as follows. First by using the no arbitrage condition which 
implies the equality of return to capital and labor in the private and public sector (2a), 
(2b), (5a) and (5b) and the labor and private capital allocations (8a) and (8b), together 
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In principle, one can solve these two equations for the allocation of labor and private 
capital across the production of private and public capital:  
      (,) G kk qq =               (17a) 
      (,) G kk ff =               (17b) 
In the Appendix I show how the equilibrium dynamics can be expressed as the following 
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        (18c)   14 
(.) and (.) fq  are determined by (17a), and respectively (17b). 
This third order system has two sluggish variables,  and  G kk , and one jump variable, c.  
To yield a well behaved dynamic behavior I require that the eigenvalues of this system 
consist of two stable and one unstable root, a property that I found to prevail over all of 
our wide-ranging simulations. 
 
3.1  Steady State 
 
The steady state of this economy, denoted by “~”, is obtained by setting 
0 G kkc === && &  in (18a) – (18c) and can be summarized by: 
 
()() k yck dy -=+ % %%                   (19a) 
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together with the allocation conditions (16a, b). 
Equation (19a) describes the growth of private output, given consumption, necessary to 
provide the private capital to equip the growing labor force and replace depreciation.  
Equation (19b) is an analogous condition for public capital while equation (19c) equates 




3.2  Centrally Planned Economy 
 
The central planner possesses complete information and chooses all quantities directly, 
taking into account the congestion caused by all agents. The formal optimization is to 
maximize per capita utility in the economy: 
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s.t.  K KYCK d =-- &  and  GGG KJK d =- &           (20b) 
 
The optimality conditions for such an economy comprise the efficient allocation (16a), 
the scale adjusted production functions (15a, b), t he equilibrium growth conditions 
()() k yck dy -=+ % %%  and  () gg jk dy =+ % %  together with: 
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where q denotes the shadow price of public capital in terms of private capital. These 8 
equations determine the steady state solutions for  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ,,,,,,. cykkjandq g fq  Note that 
the implied investment share,  ˆ g is obtained from the ratio
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
j g y = . In contrast to the 
decentralized economy, the after tax private rates of return to capital are replaced by the 
corresponding social rate of returns, which take into consideration the congestion effects 
imposed by the accumulation of private capital. Thus in (21b)  the after tax return to 
capital which incorporates the effect of relative congestion that affects only the individual 
agent is replaced by the social return to a unit of capital which incorporates the effect of 
absolute congestion that affects the whole economy, and ignores the relative congestion 
effects which is irrelevant in the aggregate. Similarly (21a) determines the socially 
optimal ratio of public capital to private capital.  (21b) and (21c) equate the long run 
social rates of return to investment in the two types of capital to the rate of return to 
consumption, again taking into consideration the effect of absolute congestion affecting 
them.   16 
 
 
4.  Numerical Analysis of Transitional Paths 
 
Further insight into the effects of fiscal policy can be obtained by carrying out numerical 
analysis of the model. I begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, calibrating the  
model using the parameters representative of the US economy (Table 1.a) 
The elasticity on capital implies that approximately 35% of output accrues to 
private capital and the rest to labor, which grows at an annual rate of 1.5%. The elasticity 
s=0.2 on public capital implies that public capital generates a significant externality in 
production. This parameter lies within the range of the consensus estimates (see Gramlich 
1994). For the benchmark economy I consider that the private and the public production 
functions are identical. However, in my analysis I consider the cases where the public 
production is either more capital intensive or labor intensive than the private production 
function and evaluate how this change in the production parameters modify our results. 
I vary the congestion parameters from 0 to 1, from a pure public good to varying 
degree of rivalry for both types of congestion. The analysis performs permutation of these 
models, i.e. 1-q=0.5 and s=1 means that there is some degree of relative congestion, that 
the individual increasing its relative possession of private capital derives a higher level of 
services from the provision of the public good. At the same time since s=1 the increase in 
aggregate capital diminishes the level of services that each individual derives due to the 
crowding effect. I also experiment with different degree of congestion in the two 
production functions, i.e. 1-q1=0.5, 1-qp=1, s1=1 that I did not report in the paper. In this 
case, keeping ? constant sp is derived endogenously within the model. The reason for 
which I prefer to limit the analysis to identical levels of congestion in the two production 
function is that even if there valid arguments for having different production function for 
the public and private capital, it is difficult to argue that identical factors of production 
(labor and private capital) are subject to different degree of congestion. Also, if the public 
congestion function experiences a higher degree of relative congestion than the private 
production function, the resulting degree of absolute congestion is negative, which means 
that there are positive aggregate capital spillovers.     17 
The value of ?=-1.5 implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption of 0.4, consistent with the estimation by Ogaki and Reinhardt (1998). The 
benchmark tax on wage income, tw=0.28 reflects the average marginal personal income 
tax rate in the US. Given the complex nature of capital income taxes, part of which may 
be taxed at a lower rate than wages and part of which at a higher rate, I have chosen the 
common rate, tk=0.28 as the benchmark. The annual depreciation rates d G=0.035 and 
dK=0.05 approximate the average depreciation rates for public and private capital for the 
US during recent years. 
These parameters lead to the benchmark equilibria reported in Table  1.b.  
Focusing on  0.35 d =  and no congestion, the total consumption-output ratio = 0.84, the 
private output-private capital ratio = 0.46, and the ratio of public to private capital = 0.32. 
The benchmark equilibrium also implies that over 96% of labor and private capital is 
employed in the final output sector, which is also consistent with the available data. 
Finally, the steady-state growth rate, which by the non-scale nature of the economy is 
independent of policy, equals 2.17%.  Table 1.b reports the equilibria when the public 
investment sector is labor intensive relative to the private sector ( 0.2 d = ) and relatively 
capital intensive ( 0.5 d = ).  These fairly large changes in relative sectoral intensities have 
relatively small effects on the equilibrium. Table 1.b also reports the equilibria when we 
introduce different level of congestion. Congestion reduces the steady-state growth rate to 
1.5%. The relative congestion reduces dramatically the consumption to output ratio to 
0.73, the public to private capital ratio to 0.19 and the private output-private capital ratio 
to 0.24. At the same time a higher proportion of the resources are allocated towards the 
production of public sector.  The absolute congestion has a negative effect on the steady 
state growth, but it has a very mild effect on the ratios mentioned above. 
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where Z(t) denotes instantaneous utility and C/N is evaluated along the equilibrium path. 
The welfare gains are calculated as the percentage change in the flow of income 
necessary to equate the initial level of utility to what it would be following a policy   18 
change. The short run impact is measured by the changes in  Z(t), while the long run 
impact is summarized by the change in the overall intertemporal index W.  
The other key measure of economic performance, the measure of the intertemporal fiscal 
balance has been defined previously in equation (11b). For the assumed tax rates and 
expenditure parameters, current tax revenues exceed government expenditure on the 
inputs necessary to produce the public good.  
Table 2, 3 and 4 report the percentage changes in the intertemporal fiscal surplus, 
with a negative change implying a reduction relative to the base measure.  
 
4.1.  Normalized Fiscal Changes 
 
Table 2, 3 and 4 describe various basic policy changes from the benchmark economy. 
These are uncompensated, meaning that they lead to changes in the government’s fiscal 
deficit. To be able to make comparisons between them these changes have been 
standardized so that the tax decrease and the increase in g lead to the same increase in the 
present value of the government deficit, V (-16.8). 
 
4.1.1. Increase in government investment 
Public investment increases consumption and welfare in the short run, even as 
resources are attracted towards government investment.  The consumption output ratio 
increases upon impact and there are gains in the short run welfare. Since more resources 
are allocated towards the public sector the private capital slightly decreases in the short 
run, but increases over time as the investment bears fruit and productivity is enhanced.  
In the long run the consumption to output ratio decreases and as output increases thanks 
to the increase in productivity enhancing government capital, the long run w elfare 
increases further. In this model doubling the rate of public investment from 4% to 8% 
involves short-run welfare increase of between 2.5% - 4.3% and intertemporal welfare 
gains of between 8.3% - 13%, depending upon the relative sectoral capital intensities   19 
(see table 2, 3 and 4). 
Intuitively, on one hand the increase in output in the future would imply through 
consumption smoothing that consumption increases upon impact, but on the other hand 
this increase in output is due to the increase in government capital which implies that 
more resources should be allocated to production. The simulations show that 
consistently the consumption output ratio increases upon impact and therefore the 
welfare effects in the short run are positive and continue to increase in the long run.   
As either/both relative and absolute congestion of the public good increase, the 
level of services that one derives from an  increase in the government capital declines 
and thus the benefits on both the short run and long run welfare decrease. The relative 
congestion effect is far more damaging from the welfare point of view than the absolute 
congestion effect. As relative congestion increases, the agents perceive the private 
capital as being more productive, since it increases the level of services that they derive 
from the public good and implicitly their private marginal return to capital. Therefore 
they over-accumulate capital, the public good becomes congested and the increased 
productivity and welfare effects brought about by the increase in g are significantly 
diminished.  
If 1-q1=1, the short run welfare effect of increasing g becomes negative when the 
two production function are identical or the public production function is less intensive 
in capital (i.e. it varies from -0.15% to -0.22% for identical production functions and 
from -0.35% to -0.37% if the public production function is more intensive in capital, 
depending on the degree of absolute congestion). If the public production function is 
more intensive in capital the positive short run effects are still present, but significantly 
diminished (i.e. it decreases from 4.33% to 0.61% as the proportional congestion 
indicator increases from 0 to 1). The consumption to output ratio increases upon impact   20 
in all cases, but if the public production function is more intensive in capital there is 
more capital attracted towards the production of the public good and relatively less 
output  and consumption goods produced in the private sector. In general if the public 
production function is more intensive in capital the positive effects associated with the 
increase in g are significantly higher than in the case when it is less intensive in capital 
(see table 3 and 4). The increase in output is 36.32% compared to 25.11% which 
translates into an increase in the long run welfare of 12.94% compared to 8.28%.   This 
result is robust to the introduction of different degree of congestion such that even when 
both congestion effects are present simultaneously the increase in  g has a steadily 
positive welfare effect in both short and long run.  
At the same time the normalization that is used determines significant different 
changes in g depending on the introduction of relative or aggregate congestion. To 
derive the same present value of the fiscal deficit, the increase in g is much lower in the 
case when only relative congestion is present compared to the case when there is no 
congestion or only absolute congestion is present. The explanation lays in the fact that 
the agents are paid their marginal return to capital. Relative congestion translates into 
losses for the productive firms, losses that are financed from the government budget. 
Therefore as relative congestion increases the agents who ignore the social returns to 
capital over accumulate private capital and the fiscal deficit increases very fast. If I  
perform the analysis imposing the same increase in g for different degree of congestion, 
and ignoring the effect that these changes will have on the government budget, the 
welfare effects improve when the relative congestion is concerned. The relative 
congestion is still more welfare damaging than the absolute congestion, but by a lesser 
degree. 
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4.2.1. Decrease in tax on capital income 
The analysis of the normalized cut on the tax on capital income reveals a decrease 
in the consumption to output ratio of about 2% which leads also to a decrease in the 
output to capital ratio of 10% and an increase in the overall output level of 25% (see 
Table 2). In the short run the normalized reduction in this tax leads to immediate welfare 
losses of about 2.8%, as resources are diverted away from consumption toward private 
capital accumulation. In the long run the accumulation of more capital and output 
generate intertemporal welfare gains of 1.5% which are however significantly lower 
than the gains that are generated by the equivalent increase in g.  
As the congestion of the public good increases, the benefits of decreasing the tax 
on capital income decrease. In contrast with the increase in the share of the government 
investment g, the absolute congestion has a more damaging effect than the relative 
congestion, due to the increase in the aggregate capital brought by the decrease in the 
capital income tax. These results hold even when it is normalized with respect to the 
amount of tax being cut (i.e a decrease of tk from 0.28 to 0.2 determines long run 
welfare losses of 0.63% if I consider the relative congestion and of 1.18% if I consider 
the absolute congestion effect, both independently; if both effects are considered 
simultaneously the welfare loss is 3.47%). Similar to the analysis concerning the 
increase in g, it is noticeable that the normalization affects more significantly the change 
in the level of taxes in the case of relative congestion due to the losses incurred by firms 
who have to pay the agents the private  marginal return to capital. As I  increase the 
relative congestion the decrease in the level of taxes necessary to reach the benchmark 
present value of the fiscal deficit is lower, therefore the short run welfare losses 
diminish.  
The increase in absolute congestion causes a significant decrease in the welfare in   22 
the short run. As the absolute congestion increases, the positive long run welfare steadily 
diminishes, such that when s=1 the change in long run welfare becomes negative. The 
cut of the tax on capital income determines an increase in the aggregate private capital. 
As the congestion effect becomes more prevalent, the increase in output brought by a 
more intensive investment in private capital is lower. Since the consumption-output ratio 
decreased to allow for a higher accumulation of capital, the new steady state 
consumption is lower than before the shock.  
The results of the cut in income tax do not differ significantly based on the capital 
intensity of the public production function. The highest short run welfare losses ( -
4.19%) are derived when the public production function is more intensive in capital and 
the only congestion effect is due to aggregate congestion.  At the same time if the public 
production function is more intensive in capital, the cut in capital income tax brings on 
the highest increase in the long run welfare (1.52%) when there are no congestion 
effects.    
The allocation of resources is determined by the capital intensity of the public 
production function. A decrease in the tax on capital income determines the reallocation 
of resources (private capital and labor) towards the sector less intensive in private capital 
(private sector if the public production function is more intensive in capital and public 
sector in the opposite case).   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on the role of government capital as a critical productive input 
when the level of services that the agent derives from it is subject to congestion. I 
develop a two sector model in which private output is produced in one sector by profit-
maximizing firms and government capital is produced in a second sector by cost 
minimizing firms. The two sectors compete in hiring labor and private capital, and the   23 
public capital provides a positive externality. The two production functions can differ in 
their sectoral intensities. We introduce two types of congestion associated with the 
positive externality of the public capital, relative and aggregate congestion.  
We analyze the growth and welfare effects of an increase in government 
investment and equivalent decrease in the tax on capital income. 
Public investment in general increases consumption and welfare in the short run 
and long run. (i.e. an increase in the rate of public investment from 4% to 8% involves 
short-run welfare increase of between 2.5% - 4.3% and intertemporal welfare gains of 
between 8.3% - 13%, depending upon the relative sectoral capital intensities. Normalized 
government investment will be significantly more expansionary as the capital intensity of 
the public sector increases. 
 The introduction of congestion decreases the positive effects brought by the fiscal 
policies that I analyze. It also decreases the steady state growth rate of the economy.  
The introduction of relative congestion has stronger negative effects when one 
analyzes the increase in g, whereas the absolute congestion has stronger negative effects 
if one analyzes the decrease in the tax on capital income. 
The normalized decrease of the tax on capital income determines a decrease in the 
consumption to output ratio of about 2% and an increase in the overall output level of 
25%. In the short run it leads to welfare losses of about 2.8%, while in the long run it 
generates intertemporal welfare gains of 1.5%. The increase in absolute congestion 
causes a significant decrease in the welfare in the short run. As the absolute congestion 
increases, the long run welfare gains steadily diminish until they reach negative values.  
The allocation of resources is determined by the capital intensity of the public 
production function. A decrease in the tax on capital income determines the reallocation 
of resources towards the sector less intensive in private capital. As relative congestion 
increases, the reallocation of resources from one sector to the other diminishes. 
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Table 1.a 
Base Parameters Values 
Production parameters  aJ=1,  s=0.2,  b=0.35, d G=0.035,  d K=0.05, a Y=1,  n=0.015, 
d0=0.35, ?0=0.2, d1=0.2, ?1=0.246, d2=0.5, ?2=0.1538 
Congestion parameters  1-q1=1-qp=0, 0.5, 1 
s1=sp=0, 0.5, 1 
Preference parameters  ?=-1.5, ?= 1.75, ß=0.04 




      c/y  Kg/k  y/k  T  F  ?  PV 
Govt 
DEf 




0.84  0.32  0.464  96.1  96.1  2.166  -7.11 




0.73  0.19  0.24  93.59  93.59  1.5  -4.23 




0.83  0.32  0.4  96.15  96.15  1.5  -6.69 




0.84  0.33  0.47  94.77  97.5  2.166  -6.87 




0.73  0.197  0.24  89.91  93.12  1.5  -2.81 




0.839  0.324  0.405  94.6  97.4  1.5  -6.49 




0.84  0.32  0.46  97.57  95.59  2.16  -7.43 




0.74  0.2  0.25  96.44  94.61  1.5  -5.56 




0.83  0.31  0.39  97.65  95.73  1.5  -6.95 
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Table 2   
Uncompensated Fiscal Changes Normalized with respect to Present Value of Fiscal 
Deficit V (Identical Production Function for Private and Public Capital) 
b=0.35, d=0.35, s=0.2; ?=0.2, 
Percentage change in the PV of budget deficit: -16.8 
 








No congestion effect: q=1, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.08 
-0.702  -3.7  92.59  33.81  157.7  28.86  -14.7  2.89  9.67 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2 
-2  -9.88  -9.88  20.33  8.43  8.43  -11.4  -2.77  1.46 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0621 
-0.648  -2.44  51.46  19.6  81.15  16.68  -14.94  2.89  9.67 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2336 
-1.6  -6.05  -6.05  11.74  4.97  4.97  -13.28  -2.32  0.32 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0493 
-0.43  -1.2  21.76  8.56  32.2  7.25  -15.85  -0.15  1.6 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2602 
-0.975  -2.67  -2.67  4.94  2.132  2.132  -15.13  -1.33  0.13 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0805 
-0.73  -3.74  93.7  27.17  146.3  22.41  -14.92  2.51  8.71 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.1993 
-2.11  -10  -10  16.71  4.94  4.94  -11.69  -3.48  0.080 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0624 
-0.67  -2.47  52.14  15.95  76.42  13.09  -15.14  0.57  4.28 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2333 
-1.74  -6.12  -6.12  9.63  2.91  2.91  -13.46  -2.76  -0.52 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0493 
-0.44  -1.2  21.76  6.95  30.23  5.66  -15.85  -0.18  1.44 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.26 
-1.01  -2.7  -2.7  4.065  1.25  1.25  -15.28  -1.53  -0.51 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.081 
-0.76  -3.79  94.99  22.81  139.48  18.14  -15.12  2.2  7.81 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.198 
-2.2  -10.22  -10.22  14.19  2.52  2.52  -11.88  -4.18  -1.21 
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Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0602 
-0.64  -2.42  51.23  19.52  80.76  16.62  -14.88  0.7  4.68 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2328 
-1.8  -6.15  -6.15  8.12  1.47  1.47  -13.51  -3.17  -1.29 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0495 
-0.46  -1.22  22.22  5.96  29.52  4.66  -16.18  -0.22  1.29 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.26 
-1.04  -2.7  -2.7  3.42  0.63  0.63  -15.28  -1.71  -0.85 
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Table 3   
Uncompensated Fiscal Changes Normalized with respect to Present Value of Fiscal 
Deficit V (Public Production Function more intensive in capital) 
b=0.35, d=0.5, s=0.2; ?=0.1538, 
Percentage change in the PV of budget deficit: -16.8 
 








No congestion effect: q=1, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0882 
-0.97  -5.04  109.3  43.56  200.6  36.32  -14.48  4.33  12.94 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.1995 
-2.03  -9.96  -9.96  20.77  8.68  8.68  -11.44  -2.81  1.52 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.07 
-0.85  -3.19  69.4  27.77  116.4  23.68  -14.5  2.03  7.66 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2306 
-1.75  -6.35  -6.35  12.53  5.37  5.37  -13.16  -2.43  0.394 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0553 
-0.61  -1.71  35.87  14.68  55.83  12.71  -14.98  0.61  3.638 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2554 
-1.18  -3.26  -3.26  6.169  2.699  2.699  -14.84  -1.60  0.115 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0899 
-1.02  -5.11  113.2  35.38  188.7  28.54  -14.68  3.83  11.7 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.198 
-2.13  -10.12  -10.12  16.96  5.11  5.11  -11.63  -3.51  0.13 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0707 
-0.89  -3.22  71.28  22.7  110.1  18.74  -14.6  1.81  7.01 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2299 
-1.84  -6.45  -6.45  10.2  3.18  3.18  -13.33  -2.89  -0.49 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0556 
-0.64  -1.74  37.06  12.21  53.81  10.25  -15.17  0.55  3.4 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.255 
-1.24  -3.32  -3.32  5.1  1.6  1.6  -14.99  -1.86  -0.58 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0919 
-0.64  -1.74  37.06  12.21  53.81  10.25  -15.71  0.55  3.4 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.1968 
-2.22  -10.26  -10.26  14.38  2.64  2.64  -11.78  -4.19  -1.17   28 
 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0724 
-0.94  -3.35  74.93  19.71  109.4  15.7  15.12  1.63  6.48 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.229 
-1.91  -6.55  -6.55  8.79  1.66  1.66  -13.51  -3.35  -1.33 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0564 
-0.675  -1.79  38.47  10.59  53.14  8.61  -15.52  0.47  3.13 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2548 
-1.28  -3.34  -3.34  4.33  0.843  0.843  -15.04  -
2.098 
-1.01 
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Table 4   
Uncompensated Fiscal Changes Normalized with respect to Present Value of Fiscal 
Deficit V (Public Production Function less intensive in Capital) 
b=0.35, d=0.2, s=0.2; ?=0.246, 
Percentage change in the PV of budget deficit: -16.8 
 








No congestion effect: q=1, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0773 
-0.41  -2.27  88.85  28.02  141.78  25.11  -15.32  2.54  8.28 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.202 
-1.95  -9.82  -9.82  19.91  8.132  8.132  -11.22  -2.74  1.4 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0575 
-0.45  -1.72  41.27  14.27  61.438  12.30  -15.63  0.101  3.033 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2368 
-1.56  -5.71  -5.71  10.81  4.48  4.48  -13.27  -2.19  0.24 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.04525 
-0.25  -0.71  12.32  4.46  17.33  3.72  -16.62  -0.35  0.557 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2659 
-0.708  -1.94  -1.94  3.46  1.45  1.45  -15.36  -0.97  -0.13 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.077 
-0.437  -2.3  88.07  22.18  129.79  19.37  -15.53  2.23  7.45 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.201 
-2.05  -9.94  -9.94  16.2  4.67  4.67  -11.51  -3.42  0.026 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0573 
-0.468  -1.72  40.77  11.38  56.8  9.46  -15.78  0.028  2.72 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2367 
-1.61  -5.72  -5.72  8.78  2.55  2.55  -13.37  -2.58  -0.54 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=0.5 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0451 
-0.26  -0.69  11.96  3.53  15.92  2.8  -16.65  -0.35  0.48 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.26623 
-0.71  -1.9  -1.9  2.76  0.8  0.8  -15.29  -1.09  -0.39 
Congestion effects: q=1, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0771 
-0.45  -2.33  88.24  18.46  123  15.69  -15.82  2.01  6.74 
Decrease in tk:  -2.13  -10.05  -10.05  13.74  2.3  2.3  -11.67  -4.09  -1.25   30 
0.28 to 0.2 
 
Congestion effects: q=0.5, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.0575 
-0.49  -1.76  41.21  9.62  54.8  7.68  -16.19  -
0.037 
2.44 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2365 
-1.66  -5.75  -5.75  7.41  1.24  1.24  -13.5  -2.97  -1.27 
Congestion effects: q=0, s=1 
Increase in g: 
0.04 to 0.045 
-0.26  -0.69  11.72  2.91  14.98  2.2  -16.7  -0.35  0.39 
Decrease in tk: 
0.28 to 0.2664 
-0.72  -1.87  -1.87  2.3  0.38  0.38  -15.32  -1.2  -
0.625 
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Appendix 
 
In this Appendix I derive the linear approximation to the macro-dynamic equilibrium 
employed in our simulations.  I begin with the four equilibrium equations (18a) – (18c) 
written as  
() K kyck dy =--+ &              (A.1a) 
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Note that these expressions all involve the partial derivatives 







To evaluate these, I proceed in the following sequential manner.  Taking differentials of 
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  Expressions (A.4 a-c) yield all the partial derivatives and substituting these partial 
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